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MADSEN V. WOMEN'S HEALTH CENTER, INC.: 
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ABORTION 
CLINIC BUFFER ZONES 
The camera focuses on a woman who faces the 
clinic and, hands cupped over her mouth, shouts 
the following: "God's judgment is on you, and if 
you don't repent, He will strike you dead. The 
baby's blood flowed over your hands . . . . An 
innocent little child, a little boy, a little girl, is 
being destroyed right now." Cheering is audible 
from the clinic grounds. A second person shouts 
"You are responsible for the deaths of chil-
dren .... You are a murderer .... " The first 
woman says "We will be everywhere .... There 
will be no peace and no rest for the wicked .... 
I pray that you will give them dreams and 
nightmares, God."l 
1. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2536-37 (1994) (per 
Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Blackmun, O'Connor, Souter & Ginsburg, JJ.; per 
Souter, J., concurring; per Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part; 
per Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Kennedy & 
Thomas, JJ.) (quoting Justice Scalia's description of part of a videotape entered 
into the trial court record containing footage of demonstrations at the Florida 
abortion clinic, Aware Woman Center for Choice). 
543 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc.,2 the United 
States Supreme Court considered whether an injunction re-
stricting anti-abortion demonstrations outside a Florida abor-
tion clinic unconstitutionally infringed upon protesters' First 
Amendment rights.3 The decision upheld the injunction's key 
provision, a thirty-six foot "buffer zone" surrounding the clinic, 
but struck down other provisions.4 
Although abortion has been legal since 1973,5 anti-abor-
tion opponents have been active in recent years, picketing and 
demonstrating extensively at clinics across the country. Rath-
er than enduring continued disruption and distress, some of 
these clinics have sought injunctions to neutralize the protest 
areas.6 
Trial courts have often responded by issuing injunctions 
creating "buffer zones"7 outside of clinics.8 In assessing the 
constitutionality of these injunctions, reviewing courts have 
generally applied the traditional, intermediate standard used 
for analyzing content-neutral injunctions and ordinances.9 
2. 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994). 
3. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2521. U.S. CONST. amend I provides, in part, that 
"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . or the 
right of the people peaceably to 89semble . . . ." 
4. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2521. 
5. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that women have a quali-
fied right to obtain abortions). ' 
6. See infra note 8 for a list of cases. 
7. "Buffer zones" are areas surrounding abortion clinic property lines, usually 
defined by a number of feet, in which protesters are prohibited from entering or 
demonstrating. See Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2522. 
8. See, e.g., Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 939 F.2d 57 (3d Cir. 
1991) (sustaining injunction prohibiting all but six pickets within 500 feet of clin-
ic); Portland Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Advocates for Life, Inc., 859 F.2d 
681 (9th Cir. 1988) (sustaining 12 and 1/2 foot "free zone" around clinic entrance); 
Pro-Choice Network of Western N.Y. v. Project Rescue, 799 F. Supp. 1417 
(W.D.N.Y. 1992) (imposing 15-foot' "clear zone" around clinic entrances and people 
and vehicles seeking access thereto); Planned Parenthood v. Holy Angels Catholic 
Church, 765 F. Supp. 617 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (establishing "no protest" zone within 
25 feet of clinic entrance); Planned Parenthood v. Williams, 873 P.2d 1224 (Cal. 
1994) (sustaining injunction banning protesters from public sidewalk outside clinic); 
Fargo Women's Health Org., Inc. v. Lambs of Christ, 502 N.W. 2d 536 (N.D. 1992) 
(sustaining injunction providing 100-foot "protected zone" around clinic). 
9. First Amendment activity is subject to different levels of protection depend-
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Madsen, however, set precedent by developing a new, stricter 
standard to apply when evaluating content-neutral injunctions 
in a First Amendment context. 10 
This note will discuss the new standard introduced by the 
United States Supreme Court, the Court's rationale behind its 
introduction, and the standard's application to the facts of 
Madsen. ll Next, the author will explore how this standard 
will influence the decisions arid injunctions already implement-
ed by state courts and how the standard may result in reduced 
protection for women's reproductive rights.12 Finally, the au-" 
thor will explain why the states' interest in protecting clinic 
access is strong enough to justify the continued use of buffer 
zones despite the stricter standard courts must apply.13 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Women's Health Center, Inc., operates abortion clinics 
throughout central Florida. One of these clinics, the Aware 
Woman Center for Choice (hereinafter "the Clinic"), became 
the site of extensive anti-abortion protests and demonstra-
tions. 14 In September 1992, a Florida state court permanently 
ing on where the activity occurs. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educator's 
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983). If it occurs in a traditional public forum, such as public 
streets, sidewalks, or parks, then the government cannot deny all access to such 
areas for the purpose of expressing First Amendment rights. [d. However, the 
government may regulate speech-related conduct in a public forum by establishing 
content-neutral time, place and manner regulations subject to intermediate scruti-
ny. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Schneider v. State, 308 
U.S. 147 (1939). 
First Amendment rights in a non-public forum, however, are subject to less 
protection and are analyzed under minimal scrutiny. See Perry, 460 U.S at 37. 
Regulations affecting the time, place and manner of conduct will be upheld if they 
are viewpoint neutral and reasonably related to a legitimate government purpose. 
See, e.g., International Soc'y of Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701 
(1992) (holding that airport terminals are not public forums); Lehman v. City of 
Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (holding that a city bus is not a public fo-
rum). 
10. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2524-25. See infra notes 51-62 and accompanying 
text for new standard. 
11. See infra notes 40-103 and accompanying text. 
12. See infra notes 151-168 and accompanying text. 
13. See infra notes 169-182 and accompanying text. 
14. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2521 (1994). 
Women's Health Center described these demonstrations as "a sustained effort by 
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enjoined anti-abortion protesters from interfering with public 
access to the Clinic and from physically abusing persons enter-
ing or exiting it.15 
Despite the court order, protesters continued to interfere 
with Clinic access, discouraged potential patients from enter-
ing the Clinic, and adversely affected the physical health of 
Clinic patients. IS Therefore, six months after its issuance, 
Women's Health Center sought to broaden the injunction.17 
The state court granted a broader injunction, finding that 
protesters had disobeyed the initial order by continuing to 
block Clinic access. IS Specifically, the court found that protest-
anti-abortion forces to shut down the only women's health clinic in Brevard Coun-
ty, Florida, the Aware Woman Center for Choice in Melbourne." Respondent's Brief 
at I, Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994) (No. 93-880). 
According to Women's Health Center, this campaign against Aware Woman Center 
and other central Florida abortion clinics began in 1991 when Rescue America 
sent out leaflets announcing the arrival of Operation Rescue-National in central 
Florida. [d. at 1 (citing the full Record on Appeal at 9-10). A temporary injunction 
was issued in 1991, after activities at the Clinic became too disruptive to Clinic 
employees and patients, and a permanent injunction was issued in September 
1992. [d. 
15. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2521. The issuance of the permanent injunction was 
based upon trial court findings that: 
[The Protesters) are individuals and organizations, acting 
in concert, who have planned a nationwide campaign 
which they call "OPERATION RESCUE"... directed 
towards closing down abortion clinics and providers 
throughout the country . . . [and that the Petitioner Ed 
Martin had) stated an intent to prevent persons from 
having abortions in the Brevard and Seminole County 
areas by blocking access to the clinics. 
Respondent's Brief at 1-2, Madsen (No. 93-880) (citing Joint Appendix at 6-7). The 
trial court further found that Martin had issued a press release announcing an 
'Operation Rescue' for central Florida. [d. at 2 n.2 (citing Joint Appendix at 7). 
Women's Health Center asserted that, although the protesters attempted to 
distance themselves from Operation Rescue by denying that they are members of 
the organization, the record is not in question. [d. at 2. 
16. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2521. Women's Health Center observed that, not 
only did protesters fail to obey the permanent injunction, but that activity against 
the Clinic actually escalated after the September 1992 court order. Respondent's 
Brief at 2, Madsen (No. 93-880). In the months following, the Clinic was attacked 
with butyric acid, the Clinic doors were sealed with super glue, a Clinic doctor 
received threats including a mock shooting, false statements were made against 
the medical staff, and focused residential picketing against Clinic staff continued. 
[d. at 3 (citing Joint Appendix at 54, 191, 215, 246-47, 498). 
17. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2521. 
18. [d. Women's Health Center emphasized the deliberate nature of the 
4
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ers had congregated on the paved portion of the street leading 
to the Clinic, marched in front of Clinic driveways, and slowed 
cars approaching the Clinic by standing in their path, ap-
proaching the cars, and attempting to give the occupants anti-
abortion literature.19 The number of protesters varied, rang-
ing from a few to four hundred.20 The noise level also varied; 
it included everything from singing and chanting to the use of 
loudspeakers and bullhorns.21 
The state court found that the demonstrations were ad-
versely affecting the health of Clinic patients.22 A Clinic doc-
tor testified that Clinic patients confronted by aggressive pro-
testers were exposed to increased medical risks.23 The doctor 
explained that such patients "manifested a higher level of anxi-
ety and hypertension causing those patients to need a higher 
level of sedation to undergo the surgical procedure, thereby 
increasing the risk associated with such procedures.,,24 Noise 
from demonstrations was audible inside the Clinic and 
stressed patients both during surgical procedures and in the 
recovery room.25 Some patients even delayed their medical 
treatment by turning away from the Clinic to avoid the pro-
testers entirely.26 The doctor further testified to the health 
risks associated with such delays.27 
Clinic doctors and workers were targeted at their homes as 
protesters' activities: "Throughout the rest of 1992, the Rescue America newsletter, 
written by Petitioners Martin and Madsen . . . continued to urge 'rescue' activity, 
which was defined in this publication: The term rescue refers to blockikng Isicl 
access to the entrance of abortion clinics . . . . In most cases, the clinic is shut for 
the day. Many appointments do. not reschedule." Respondent's Brief at 2-3, Madsen 
(No. 93-880) (citing Joint Appendix at 109, 413-15). 
19. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2521. 
20. [d. 
21. [d. Respondents described the situation at the Clinic as having become so 
desperate that the local police captain testified that "enforcement of the injunction 
would help the -police maintain public order and safety ... and that a neutral 
zone would be helpful to the situation." Respondent's Brief at 8, Madsen (No. 93-
880) (citing Joint Appendix at 260, 299). 





27. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2521. 
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well.28 Protesters picketed in front of Clinic employees' resi-
dences, informed neighbors that the employees were "baby 
killers," shouted at passersby, and even confronted the chil-
dren of Clinic employees who were home alone.29 
The protesters' behavior led the state court to amend its 
prior order, enjoining a broader range of protest activities.3o 
The provisions of the amended injunction prohibited protest-
ers31 at all times and on all days from 1) blocking access to or 
from any Clinic building or parking lot, 2) demonstrating or 
entering within thirty-six feet of the property line of the Clin-
ic,32 3) physically approaching any person within three hun-
dred feet of the Clinic who seeks Clinic services and does not 
indicate a desire to communicate, 4) demonstrating or picket-
ing within three hundred feet of Clinic employees' residences, 
and 5) singing, chanting, using sound amplification equipment 
or making other sounds or images observable within earshot of 
patients inside the Clinic during the hours of 7:30 a.m. 
through noon, Monday through Saturday, during surgical and 
28.Id. 
29. Id. One Clinic nurse, a single mother of three daughters, quit her job 
because she and her children were the targets of residential picketing. 
Respondent's Brief at 6, Madsen, (No. 93-880) (citing Joint Appendix at 492-521). 
Although she eventually returned to work, she moved residences after a group of 
15 protesters stood outside her home while two activists outside her door accosted 
her daughters and urged them to convince their mother to stop working at the 
Clinic and to "stop killing babies." Id. One of the children, crying, called her moth-
er at work; the mother raced home to find "three terrified little girls." Id. (citing 
Joint Appendix at 505-7). The nurse moved shortly thereafter because she felt her 
family "needed to find a safe place that provided some sense of security, some-
place if they did find us that at least it would not be invisible to the public." Id. 
at 7 n.10 (citing Joint Appendix at 506). 
30. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2521. The state court concluded that "its original 
injunction had proven insufficient 'to protect the health, safety, and rights of wom-
en in Brevard and Seminole County, Florida, and surrounding counties seeking 
access to [medical and counseling) services .... Id. 
31. The injunction was directed at petitioners, as well as "Operation Rescue, 
Operation Rescue America, Operation Goliath, their officers, agents, members, 
employees and servants, and ... Bruce Cadle, Pat Mahoney, Randall Terry ... 
and all persons acting in concert or participation with them, or on their behalf." 
Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2521 n.1. 
32. An exception to the 36-foot buffer zone was the area immediately acljacent 
to the Clinic on the east; protesters had to remain at least five feet from the 
Clinic's east line. Another exception related to the record title owners of the prop-
erty to the north and west of the Clinic. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2522 (citing Oper-
ation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 626 So. 2d 664, 669-70 (Fla. 1993». 
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recovery periods.33 
The Florida Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of 
the amended injunction.34 The court found that the injunction 
was content-neutral and accordingly, applied intermediate 
scrutiny, concluding that the restrictions were "narrowly tai-
lored to serve a significant government interest,and [left] open 
ample alternative channels of communication."35 Shortly be-
fore the Florida Supreme Court announced its opinion, how-
ever, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit heard a separate challenge to the same injunction and 
struck it down.36 
The Eleventh Circuit determined that the injunction was 
content-based and accordingly, applied strict scrutiny, holding 
that the restrictions were neither necessary to serve a compel-
ling governmental interest, nor narrowly tailored to achieve 
that end.37 The Eleventh Circuit found that public safety and 
order were adequately served by existing laws without having 
to infringe upon the First Amendment freedoms of others.3s 
33. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2522-23. Other provisions of the injunction, uncon-
tested by the protesters, prohibited them at all times and on all days from: 1) 
entering the premises and property of the Aware Woman Center for Choice" 2) 
physically abusing persons entering or leaving the Clinic, 3) intimidating or physi-
cally abusing any former or present Clinic doctor or worker, and 4) encouraging or 
inciting other persons to commit the prohibited acts. [d. at 2522. 
34. [d. at 2521 (citing Operation Rescue, 626 So. 2d at 664). 
35. [d. at 2522-23 (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educator's Ass'n, 
460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983». Prior to Madsen, content-neutral injunctions were analyzed 
under intermediate scrutiny, the same level of scrutiny applied to content-neutral 
regulations. This standards demands that the injunctions be narrowly tailored to 
serve significant governmental interests and leave open ample alternative means of 
communication. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 
293 (1984) (upholding content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation prohibit-
ing sleeping in public park to protest homelessness). 
Content-based injunctions and regulations are analyzed under strict scrutiny, 
requiring that they be necessary to serve compelling governmental interests and 
"narrowly drawn to achieve that end." See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. 
36. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2523. See Cheffer v. McGregor, 6 F.3d 705 (11th 
Cir. 1993). 
37. Cheffer, 6 F.3d at 711 (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1980) 
(striking down content-based ban prohibiting all residential picketing except labor 
disputes». The Eleventh Circuit characterized the dispute as a clash "between an 
actual prohibition of speech and a potential hinderance to the free exercise of 
abortion rights." [d. at 711. 
38. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2523 (citing Cheffer, 6 F.3d at 711). 
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The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
resolve the conflict between the Florida Supreme Court and 
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals regarding the constitu-
tionality of the state court's amended injunction.39 
III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. THE INJUNCTION Is CONTENT-NEUTRAL 
The Madsen Court40 began its analysis by asking whether 
the injunction was content and viewpoint neutral, for the an-
swer dictated the appropriate level of scrutiny.41 The protest-
ers contended that, because the injunction restricted the 
behavior of only anti-abortion protesters, it was necessarily 
content-based, and thus deserved the strictest scrutiny.42 The 
Madsen Court rejected this argument, however, finding that 
the injunction targeted only the conduct, not the content, of 
anti-abortion protests.43 
The Madsen Court explained that content-neutrality is 
determined by asking whether the government has adopted 
39. 1d. 
40. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994). 
41. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2523. The guarantees of the First Amendment pro· 
vide that: "[G)overnment has no power to restrict expression because of its mes-
sage, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." Police Dep't of Chicago v. 
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). Nonetheless, government may regulate the time, 
place, and manner of speech, provided that the regulations are not based upon the 
content or subject matter of the speech. See Consolidated Edison Co. of New York 
v. Public Servo Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 530, 535-36 (1980); Cantwell V. 
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940). Thus, when a time, place, and manner 
regulation is facially content-based, the government must show that the restriction 
is justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech. See Ward V. 
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). 
Because content-based regulations present risks that the government may 
suppress certain ideas or discriminate on the basis of beliefs, content-based regula-
tions are subject to strict scrutiny. Content-neutral regulations, by contrast, do not 
present risks of governmental discrimination and thus, are subject to the less-pro-
tective intermediate scrutiny standard. See Clark V. Community for Creative Non-
Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984). 
42. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2523 (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n V. Perry Local 
Educator's Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983». 
43. 1d. The Madsen Court stated: "There is no suggestion in the record that 
Florida law would not equally restrain similar conduct directed at a target having 
nothing to do with abortion; none of the restrictions imposed by the court were 
directed at the content of petitioner's message." 1d. 
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speech regulation "without reference to the content of the regu-
lated speech.,,44 The government's purpose is the primary con-
sideration.45 Here, the Court found that the state court im-
posed the amended injunction because the protesters repeated-
ly violated the court's original order, not because of any invidi-
ous discrimination on the part of the ordering court.46 The in-
junction did not apply to pro-choice advocates because they did 
not engage in disruptive demonstrations for which relief was 
requested.47 The Court noted that to hold otherwise would 
render virtually all injunctions content-based.48 
Thus, the restrictions imposed upon the protesters were 
incidental to their anti-abortion message, not because of their 
anti-abortion message. Motives, thoughts, and ideology were 
irrelevant in determining if the injunction applied to one's 
behavior; engaging in activities prohibited by the injunction 
was the critical factor.49 Accordingly, the Madsen Court con-
cluded that the injunction was not content or viewpoint based, 
and thus, refused to apply strict scrutiny.50 The Court then 
44. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2523 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 
U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (upholding content-neutral noise regulations». 
[d. 
45. [d. 
46. [d. at 2524. The Madsen Court stated: 
47. [d. 
That petitioners all share the same viewpoint regarding 
abortion does not in itself demonstrate that some invidi-
ous content- or viewpoint-based purpose motivated the 
issuance of the order. It suggests only that those in the \ 
group whose conduct violated the court's order happen to 
share the same opinion regarding abortions being per-
formed at the clinic. In short, the fact that the injunction 
covered people with a particular viewpoint does not itself 
render the injunction content or viewpoint based. 
48. [d. The Court elaborated: 
An injunction, by its very nature, applies only to a partic-
ular group (or individuals) and regulates the activities, 
and perhaps the speech, of that group. It does so, howev-
er, because of the group's past actions in the context of a 
specific dispute between real parties. The parties seeking 
the injunction assert a violation of their rights; the court 
hearing the action is charged with fashioning a remedy 
for a specific deprivation, not with the drafting of a stat-
ute addressed to the general public. 
[d. at 2523. 
49. Madsen, 114 S.Ct. at 2523. See Respondent's Brief at 18, Madsen v. 
Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994) (No. 93-880). 
50. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2523-24. The Court also rejected a prior restraint 
9
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went on to discuss the applicable standard. 
B. NEW STANDARD APPLICABLE TO SPEECH-RESTRICTIVE 
INJUNCTIONS 
Intermediate scrutiny is the standard generally used to 
assess tpe constitutionality of content-neutral statutes or ordi-
nances.51 This standard asks whether a regulation is "narrow-
ly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest" and 
leaves open adequate alternative means of communication. 52 
Because the area outside the Clinic is a traditional public fo-
rum,53 the Madsen Court determined that intermediate scruti-
analysis urged by the protesters. 1d. at 2524. Although prior restraints, which 
come to the court with a heavy presumption of unconstitutionality, often take the 
form of injunctions, not all injunctions which incidentally affect expression are 
prior restraints. 1d. The Court found that here, the injunction was not issued 
because of the content of the protesters' expression, nor were the protesters pre-
vented from expressing their message in a variety of ways; they were only prohib-
ited from expressing it within the 36-foot buffer zone. 1d. Thus, the Court found 
prior restraint analysis unnecessary. 1d. at 2524 n.2. But See New York Times Co. 
v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (striking down as prior restraint a ban on 
publication of "The Pentagon Papers"). 
51. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2524 (1994). 
52. 1d. (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (apply-
ing intermediate scrutiny to uphold noise regulation». See also Clark v. Communi-
ty for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (applying intermediate scrutiny 
to uphold restrictions prohibiting sleeping in a public park to protest 
homelessness); Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 
U.S. 640, 647-48 (1981) (applying intermediate scrutiny to uphold time, place, and 
manner restrictions regarding the sale of literature and solicitation of funds at a 
state fair). 
53. See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (holding that public sidewalks are 
quintessential traditional public forums). First Amendment activity is subject to 
different levels of protection depending on where the activity occurs. See Perry 
Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educator's Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983). If it occurs in a 
traditional public forum, such as public streets, sidewalks, or parks, then the gov-
ernment cannot deny all access to such areas for the purpose of expressing First 
Amendment rights. 1d. However, the government may regulate speech-related con-
duct in a public forum by establishing content-neutral time, place and manner 
regulations subject to intermediate scrutiny. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 
U.S. 296 (1940); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). 
First Amendment rights in a non-public forum, however, are subject to less 
protection and are analyzed under minimal scrutiny. See Perry, 460 U.S at 37. 
Regulations affecting the time, place and manner of conduct will be upheld if they 
are viewpoint neutral and reasonably related to a legitimate government purpose. 
See, e.g., International Soc'y of Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701 
(1992) (holding that airport terminals are not public forums); Lehman v. City of 
Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (holding that a city bus is not a public fo-
10
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ny would be appropriate if the regulation at issue were a con-
tent-neutral statute.54 The Court, however, was faced with a 
content-neutral injunctive order. 
Although courts have traditionally analyzed injunctions 
and statutes under the same standard, the Madsen majority 
decided that injunctions in a First Amendment context require 
a higher degree of scrutiny than that used for generally-appli-
cable statutes.55 Therefore, the Court created a new, more 
demanding standard to apply when assessing the constitution-
ality of speech-restrictive inj unctions. 56 
The Court justified this stricter standard by explaining the 
differences between injunctions and ordinances.57 Whereas 
ordinances are passed by legislatures and are imposed indis-
criminately upon the public as a whole, injunctions are issued 
upon identified groups of wrongdoers, and thus carry "greater 
risks of censorship and discriminatory application than do 
general ordinances."56 The Court concluded that this risk jus-
tified a "somewhat more stringent application of general First 
Amendment principles in this context. "59 
rum). 
54. Madsen, 114 s. Ct. at 2524. 
55. [d. at 2524-25. 
56. See id. at 2525. 
57. [d. at 2524 ("Ordinances represent a legislative choice regarding the pro-
motion of particular societal interests. Injunctions, by contrast, are remedies im-
posed for violations (or threatened violations) of a legislative or judicial decree."). 
58. [d. (finding that "there is no more effective practical guaranty against 
arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law 
which officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally") (quoting 
Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949». 
59. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2524. The majority acknowledged that Justice 
Stevens and Justice Scalia disagreed with the new standard, but asserted that 
"consideration of all of the differences and similarities between statutes and in-
junctions supports, as a matter of policy, the standard we apply here." [d. at 
2525. See infra notes 104-08 and accompanying text for the standard Justice 
Stevens would apply. See infra notes 124-36 and accompanying text for the stan-
dard Justice Scalia would apply. 
The majority rejected Justice Scalia's argument that precedent compelled the 
application of strict scrutiny. The majority asserted that they knew of no case, nor 
did Justice Scalia cite any case, in which strict scrutiny was applied to a content-
neutral injunction. [d. 
The majority also disagreed with Justice Scalia's contention that the cases 
cited by the majority supporting their new standard actually advocate strict scruti-
ny. [d. Specifically, Justice Scalia believed that the standard adopted in Carroll v. 
11
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The Court described the new standard as more rigorous 
than intermediate scrutiny, but not as stringent as strict scru-
tiny.so Rather than merely requiring that an injunction be 
narrowly tailored to serve a significant state interest, the new 
standard demands that "provisions of the injunction burden no 
more speech than necessary to serve a significant government 
interest. mll This level of scrutiny requires more precise tailor-
ing than intermediate scrutiny.62 
C. SIGNIFICANT STATE INTERESTS EXIST 
Having articulated the new standard for injunctions, the 
Madsen Court proceeded to apply it to the case at hand. Be-
fore examining the individual injunction provisions, however, 
the Court identified and evaluated the proposed state inter-
ests. The Madsen Court agreed with the Florida Supreme 
Court's determination that the injunction promoted a number 
of significant state interests.63 The injunction served the 
strong state interest in "protecting a woman's freedom to seek 
lawful medical or counseling services in connection with her 
President and Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 183 (1968) is strict scruti-
ny, which he felt "does not remotely resemble the Court's new proposal." Madsen, 
114 S. Ct. at 2542 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). While 
Carroll requires that an injunction be "couched in the narrowest terms that will 
accomplish the pin-pointed objective" of the injunction, the new standard requires 
that an injunction "burden no more speech than necessary" to accomplish its goals. 
ld. at 2526. The majority "failled) to see a difference between the two standards." 
ld. 
60. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2525. 
61. ld. at 2525 (citing NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 
(1982); Carroll v. President and Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968); 
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967)). The Court explained that 
this standard is consistent with the principle that injunctions be no broader than 
necessary to achieve their desired goals: 
Our close attention to the fit between the objectives of an 
injunction and the restrictions it imposes on speech is 
consistent with the general rule, quite apart from First 
Amendment considerations, "that injunctive relief should 
be no more burdensome to the defendants than necessary 
to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs." 
Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2525 (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 
(1979)). 
62. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2525-26. 
63. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2526 (1994). 
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pregnancy."64 The injunction also furthered the state's inter-
est in securing public safety, promoting the free flow of traffic 
on public streets and sidewalks, and protecting citizens' prop-
erty rights.65 
Lastly, the Court acknowledged that the governmental 
interest in residential privacy extends to medical privacy as 
well.66 The Court agreed with the Florida Supreme Court's 
finding: "While targeted picketing of the home threatens the 
psychological well-being of the 'captive' resident, targeted pick-
eting of a hospital or clinic threatens not only the psychologi-
cal, but the physical well-being of the patient held 'captive' by 
medical circumstance."67 The Madsen Court concluded that a 
combination of these state interests clearly justified an "appro-
priately tailored" injunction.66 The Court then proceeded to 
examine each contested injunction provision, determining 
whether it "burden[ed] more speech than necessary to accom-
plish its goal."69 
D. Do THE INJUNCTION PROVISIONS "BURDEN MORE SPEECH 
THAN NECESSARY" To ACCOMPLISH THEIR GoALS? 
1. The Thirty-Six Foot Buffer Zone 
The thirty-six foot buffer zone prohibited protesters from 
"congregating, picketing, patrolling, demonstrating or entering" 
any part of the public or private property within 36 feet of the 
clinic's property line. "70 In effect, this provision required the 
protesters to move from the Clinic driveway to the opposite 
64. 1d. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
65. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2526 (citing Operation Rescue v. Women's Health 
Ctr., Inc., 626 So. 2d 664, 672 (Fla. 1993». 
66. 1d. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (upholding ban on targeted 
residential picketing). 
67. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2526 (citing Operation Rescue, 626 So. 2d at 673). 
See Abortion Clinic Violence: Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and 
Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st and 
2nd Sess., 1, 3, 130 (1987) (medical staff at clinics testifying before Congress about 
how psychological stress from aggressive anti-abortion demonstrations complicates 
medical treatment and compromises patients' subsequent recovery). 
68. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2526. 
69. 1d. 
70. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2526 (1994) (citing 
Operation Rescue, 626 So. 2d at 669). 
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side of the street.71 
The majority found that "[t]he 36-foot buffer zone protect-
ing the entrances to the clinic and the parking lot is a means 
of protecting unfettered ingress to and egress from the clinic, 
and ensuring that [the protesters] do not block traffic .... "72 
The Court noted that, due to the narrow confines surrounding 
the Clinic, the trial court faced limited options to protect safe 
access to the building.73 Because the protesters disobeyed the 
first injunction by interfering with such access, the state court 
decided that the protesters should not remain on the Clinic 
sidewalk or driveway, nor should they be allowed to stand in 
the middle of the street blocking traffic. 74 
The Madsen Court noted that the buffer zone did not elim-
inate all avenues of communication near the Clinic. Protesters 
could still get as close as ten to twelve feet to cars approaching 
the Clinic, and even from across the street, protesters could be 
seen and heard by people in the Clinic parking lots.75 The 
Madsen majority concluded that, in light of the continuing 
need to maintain Clinic access and the protesters' failure to 
follow the first court order, the thirty-six foot buffer zone "bur-
dened no more speech than necessary" to accomplish the 
71. [d. See Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968) (sustaining statute pro-
hibiting picketers from obstructing or unreasonably interfering with access to and 
from public buildings, including courthouses, and with traffic on adjacent street 
sidewalks). 
72. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2527. 
73. [d. The Florida Supreme Court had observed that the street is only 21 
feet wide in the area of the Clinic. [d. The Madsen Court found that "[tjhe state 
court was convinced that allowing the petitioners to remain on the clinic's side-
walk and driveway was not a viable option in view of the failure of the first in-
junction to protect access." [d. 
74. [d. ("We also bear in mind the fact that the state court originally issued a 
much narrower injunction, providing no buffer zone, and that this order did not 
succeed in protecting access to the clinic. The failure of this first order to accom-
plish its purpose may be taken into consideration in evaluating the constitutional-
ity of the broader order.") (citing National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United 
States, 435 U.S. 679, 697-98 (1978». 
The Madsen Court conceded that "[tjhe need for a complete buffer zone near 
the clinic entrances and driveway may be debatable," but explained that "some 
deference must be given to the state court's familiarity with the facts .... " 
Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2527 (citing Milk Wagon Drivers v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 
Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 294 (1941)). 
75. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2527. 
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state's goals.76 
Nonetheless, the Court struck down part of the thirty-six 
foot buffer zone provision that applied to private property to 
the north and west of the Clinic.77 The Court found that the 
patients and staff need not cross this area of private property 
to access the Clinic, nor was there evidence that the protesters' 
activities on the private property obstructed access to the Clin-
ic or blocked vehicular traffic on the street.7S Because the pur-
pose of the buffer zone was to protect Clinic entrances and 
promote the free flow of traffic in front of the Clinic, the 
Madsen Court held that this part of the provision burdened 
more speech than necessary.79 
2. The Noise Level and "Images Observable" Provision 
Next, the Madsen Court discussed the "noise level"80 and 
"images observable" provision. S1 In assessing the reasonable-
ness of such injunction provisions, the Court found it necessary 
to consider the nature of the place to which the restrictions ap-
plied.s2 Relying on its opinion in NLRB v. Baptist Hospital, 
76. [d. The majority disagreed with Justice Scalia's reliance on the videotape 
to show that no factual findings existed supporting the second irijunction: "[T)he 
state court was . . . not limited to Justice Scalia's rendition of what he saw on 
the videotape to make its findings in support of the second irijunction." [d. The 
majority pointed out that witnesses testified as to the relevant facts in a three·day 
evidentiary hearing and the protesters themselves "studiously refrained from chal· 
lenging the factual basis for the injunction both in the state courts and here." [d. 
Thus, the majority found Justice Scalia's contention that no .factual basis support-
ed the injunction to be without merit. [d. 
77. [d. at 2528. 
78. [d. 
79. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2528. 
80. For other cases limiting noise that interferes with the rights of unwilling 
listeners, see Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989); Grayned v. 
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949). 
81. This provision restricts protesters from "singing, chanting, whistling, shout-
ing, yelling, use of bullhorns, auto horns, sound amplification equipment or other 
sound or images observable to or within earshot of patients inside the [c)linic 
during the hours of 7:30 a.m. through noon on Mondays through Saturdays." 
Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2528 (1994) (citing Opera-
tion Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 626 So. 2d 664, 669 (Fla. 1993». 
82. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2528 ("[T)he nature of a place, 'the pattern of its 
normal activities, dictate the kinds of regulations. .. that are reasonable.m 
(quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972». 
15
Wohlstadter: Abortion Clinic Buffer Zones
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1995
558 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:543 
Inc.,83 the Court acknowledged that medical facilities serve 
the needs of ailing patients who particularly require an envi-
ronment of peace and quiet.84 Because noise control at medi-
cal facilities is crucial during surgery and recovery periods, the 
majority concluded that the noise-level provision, which ap-
plied only during these critical periods, withstood a First 
Amendment challenge.85 
The Madsen Court overturned the blanket ban on all "im-
ages observable," however.86 The Court reasoned that if this 
provision was intended to prevent signs threatening to the 
patients or their families, the trial court could have issued a 
narrower restriction prohibiting threatening signs, instead of 
the broad ban issued here.87 The Court also found that the 
images observable prohibition was not justified by the necessi-
ty of reducing stress and anxiety of persons inside the Clin-
ic.86 Because the Clinic could simply close its curtains, the 
Court concluded that the. restriction burdened more speech 
than necessary. 89 
3. The Three Hundred Foot No-Approach Zone 
The Madsen Court also struck down the provision requir-
ing protesters to refrain from physically approaching persons 
seeking Clinic services within three hundred feet of the Clinic 
"unless such person indicates a desire to communicate."90 Al-
83. 442 u.S. 773 (1979). The Madsen Court stated: 
Hospitals, after all are not factories or mines or assembly 
plants. They are hospitals, where human ailments are 
treated, where patients and relatives alike often are un-
der emotional strain and worry, where pleasing and com-
forting patients are principle facets of the day's activity, 
and where the patient and his family . . . need a restful, 
uncluttered, relaxing, and helpful atmosphere. 
Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2528 (quoting NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 442 U.S. 773, 
783-84 n.12 (1979) (quoting Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 509 (1978». 
84. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2528. 
85.ld. 
86. ld. at 2528-29. 
87. See id. at 2529. See supra note 81 for prohibited conduct. 
88. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2529. 
89.ld. 
90. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2529 (1994) (quot-
ing Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 626 So. 2d 664, 669 (Fla. 
16
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though the purpose of this provision was to prevent patients 
and staff from being "stalked" or "shadowed" while approach-
ing the Clinic,91 the Court held that the provision was too 
broad to serve these goals.92 Peaceful, as well as aggressive, 
approaches were prohibited.93 Absent evidence that the 
protesters' speech was independently proscribable (Le., "fight-
ing words," threats, or words fus.ed with violence), the Court 
found this prohibition to violate the First Amendment.94 In 
fact, the Madsen Court felt that the "consent" requirement 
alone invalidated the provision, as it burdened more speech 
than necessary to ensure Clinic access and prevent intimida-
tion.95 
4. The Residential Picketing Ban 
The last substantive prOVISIon challenged by protesters 
was the restriction against "picketing, demonstrating, or using 
sound amplification equipment within 300 feet of the residen-
ces of clinic staff."96 The Court overturned the sound amplifi-
cation prohibition, concluding that the state may simply order 
protesters to reduce the volume if it proves too disruptive to 
the neighborhood.97 The Court further rejected the three hun-
dred foot residential picketing ban,98 finding it overbroad: 
1993». 
91. [d. See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 
2701, 2708 (1992) ("(F]ace-to-face solicitation presents risks of duress that are an 
appropriate target of regulation. The skillful, and unprincipled, solicitor can target 
the most vulnerable, including those accompanying children or those suffering 
physical impairment and who cannot easily avoid the solicitation."). 
92. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2529. 
93. [d. 
94. [d. ("[I]n public debate our own citizens must tolerate insulting, and even 
outrageous, speech in order to provide adequate breathing space to the freedoms 
protected by the First Amendment.") (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 
(1988». 
95. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2529. 
96. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2529 (1994). 
97. [d. (citing Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972) (upholding time, 
place, and manner noise restriction near a school)). 
98. [d. at 2530 (citing Frisby v. Shultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (upholding law 
banning targeted residential picketing». In Frisby, the Court characterized the 
home as "the last citadel of the tired, the weary, and the sick." Frisby, 487 U.S. 
at 484 (quoting Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.s. 111, 125 (1969) (Black, J., concur-
ring». 
The Madsen Court distinguished the ban in Frisby on the ground that it 
17
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"[T]he 300-foot zone would ban 'general marching through 
residential neighborhoods, or even walking a route in front of 
an entire block of houses.',,99 
E. CONCLUSION OF THE MAJORITY 
The Madsen majority sustained the constitutionality of the 
Clinic's thirty-six foot buffer zone and the noise-level provision, 
finding that they burdened no more speech than necessary to 
serve the injunction's goals. loo However, the Court struck 
down the thirty-six foot buffer zone as applied to the private 
property north and west of the Clinic, .the 'images observable' 
provision, the three hundred foot no-approach zone around the 
Clinic, and the three hundred foot buffer zone around residenc-
es. 101 The Court found that these provisions "[swept] more 
broadly than necessary" to protect the state's interests. 102 
Thus, the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court was affirmed 
in part and reversed in part. 103 
was much smaller than the 300·foot zone struck down here and was limited to 
"focused picketing taking place solely in front of a particular residence." Madsen, 
114 S. Ct. at 2530 (quoting Frisby, 487 U.S. at 483). 
99. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2530 (quoting Frisby, 487 U.S. at 483). The Madsen 
Court reasoned: "The record before us does not contain sufficient justification for 
this broad ban on picketing; it appears that a limitation on the time, duration of 
picketing, and number of pickets outside a smaller zone could have accomplished 
the desired result." [d. 
100. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2530 (1994). 
101. [d. The majority also rejected the protesters' challenge that the injunction 
was vague and overbroad because it applied to those acting "in concert" with the 
named defendants. [d. Because petitioners were named parties, the Court found 
that they lacked standing to challenge the part of the order concerning those who 
were not named parties. [d. The Court also found that the phrase, "in concert," 
was not overbroad because it did not prohibit conduct or chill speech, but was 
merely directed at unnamed parties who might later be found to be "in concert" 
with named parties. [d. See Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9, 14 (1945) 
(holding that a party subject to an injunction who was not a "successor or assign" 
could not invalidate the order because it applied to "successors or assigns" of the 
enjoined party). 
The Court further rejected the argument that the "in concert" provision 
violated protesters' First Amendment freedom of association, explaining that such a 
freedom does not extend to joining with others in order to deprive third parties of 
their lawful rights. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2530. See Citizens Against Rent Con· 
troVCoalition For Fair Housing v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981) (holding that 
governmental limitations on contributions to support or oppose referendum elec-
tions violates the freedoms of speech and association). 
102. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2530. 
103. [d. Justice Souter wrote a short concurring opinion to clarify two matters 
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IV. JUSTICE STEVENS CONCURRING IN PART AND 
DISSENTING IN PART 
Justice Stevens dissented from the majority concerning 
two main issues. lo4 First, he disagreed with the majority's 
new standard. Although Justice Stevens agreed that interme-
diate scrutiny was inappropriate for reviewing a First Amend-
ment challenge to an injunction, he asserted that injunctive 
relief should be entitled to a more lenient, not a more rigorous, 
standard. lo5 Justice Stevens reasoned that, because injunc-
tions only apply to individuals who have already engaged in 
illegal conduct and are likely to repeat the offensive behavior, 
courts need the latitude of a lenient standard to fashion in-
junctive remedies which will protect against repeated viola-
tions. 106 
in the record. First, he explained that the trial judge made it clear that the issue 
of who had been acting" "in concert" with the named defendants was a matter to 
be "taken up in individual cases, and not to be decided on the basis of protesters' 
viewpoints." [d. Second, Justice Souter pointed out that the protesters themselves 
"acknowledge that the governmental interests in protection of public safety and 
order, of the free flow of traffic, and of property rights are reflected in Florida 
law." [d. at 2530-3lo 
104. In addition to his two main points of disagreement, Justice Stevens also 
objected to the fact that the majority addressed challenges to the injunction that 
were not properly before the Court. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. 
Ct. 2516, 2533 (1994). The certiorari petition presented three questions for review: 
the first asked whether the 36-foot buffer zone was an unconstitutional content-
based restriction, the second asked whether the 300-foot buffer zone consent re-
quirement provision was a reasonable time, place and manner restriction, or 
whether it was an unconstitutional prior restraint, and the third question asked 
whether the "in concert" provision violated the First Amendment. [d. at 2531 n.lo 
Because the protesters only asserted a content-based challenge to the 36-foot 
buffer zone, Justice Stevens felt the majority was wrong to modify the scope of 
that zone, which was not an issue before the Court. [d. at 2533-34. Specifically, 
Justice Stevens felt the Court should not have struck down the portion of the 
zone on the north and west sides of the Clinic which the protesters did not even 
challenge in their briefs. Justice Stevens believed that the Court should also have 
refrained from deciding the constitutionality of the noise restrictions and "images 
observables" provision, as neither of those issues were presented by the certiorari 
questions. [d. at 2533-34. 
105. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 253lo 
106. [d. ("[E)ven when an injunction impinges on constitutional rights, more 
than a 'simple proscription against the precise conduct previously pursued' may be 
required; the remedy must include appropriate restraints on 'future activities both 
to avoid a recurrence of the violation and to eliminate its consequences."') (quoting 
National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 697-98 
(1978». 
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Justice Stevens explained that ordinances require stricter 
scrutiny than injunctions because legislation is imposed upon 
an entire community, regardless of individual culpability.l07 
Thus, according to Justice Stevens, a thirty-six foot buffer zone 
that applied to an entire community would be much more 
likely to violate the First Amendment than an injunctive buffer 
zone that applied only to those previously engaged in unlawful 
conduct. 108 
Justice Stevens' second point of contention with the major-
ity concerned the three hundred foot buffer zone. Justice 
Stevens concluded that the majority incorrectly struck down 
the buffer zone prohibiting protesters from physically ap-
proaching patients unless they indicated a desire to communi-
cate. lOS Specifically, the provision provided that protesters 
"shall not accompany ... encircle, surround, harass, threaten, 
or physically or verbally abuse those individuals who choose 
not to communicate with them."110 
Justice Stevens characterized the three hundred foot buff-
er zone as a prohibition on a species of conduct, not a prohibi-
tion on speech.lll He stated that the protesters misread this 
provision as creating a "no-speech" zone in which they were 
prohibited from speaking absent consent from listeners.1l2 To 
the contrary,Justice Stevens found that the protesters were 
free to communicate with the public provided they did not 
107. [d. 
108. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2531 ("The judicial remedy for a proven violation of 
law will often include commands that the law does not impose upon the communi-
ty at large.") (quoting Teachers v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 309-10 (1986». [d. at 
2531-32. 
109. [d. at 2532. 
110. [d. at 2532 n.4. 
111. [d. at 2532. Justice Stevens elaborated on his reasoning: 
Petitioners' "counseling" of the clinic's patients is a form 
of expression analogous to labor picketing. It is a mixture 
of conduct and communication . . . . Just as it protects 
picketing, the First Amendment protects the speaker's 
right to offer "sidewalk counseling" to all passersby. That 
protection, however, does not encompass attempts to 
abuse an unreceptive or captive audience, at least under 
the circumstances of this case. 
[d. at 2532-33. 
112. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2532. 
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conduct themselves in an aggressive way: "As long as [the 
protesters] do not physically approach patients in this manner, 
they remain free not only to communicate with the public but 
also to offer verbal or written advice on an individual basis to 
the clinic's patients through their 'sidewalk counseling.'"113 
Because he concluded that the buffer zone prohibited only 
conduct while allowing a considerable amount of speech, Jus-
tice Stevens found the provision no broader than necessary to 
serve the important state goals of reducing anxiety and hyper-
tension in patients approaching the Clinic. 114 He therefore 
would have upheld the three hundred foot zone around the 
Clinic against the protesters' First Amendment challenge.u5 
V. JUSTICE SCALIA CONCURRING IN PART AND 
DISSENTING IN PART 
A. THE PROTESTERS ENGAGED IN PROTECTED FIRST 
AMENDMENT ACTIVITY 
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment in part but em-
phasized his points of disagreement in a lengthy and vigorous 
dissent. us Justice Scalia began by attacking the majority's 
fairness; he asserted that the abortion aspect of this case had 
precluded the majority from engaging in an unbiased analysis 
of the legal issues. ll7 Because Justice Scalia found the thirty-
six foot buffer zone to be "profoundly at odds with our First 
113. [d. 
114. [d. at 2533. 
115. [d. 
116. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2534-51 (1994) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Kennedy and 
Thomas, JJ.). 
117. [d. at 2535. Justice Scalia quoted Justice O'Connor's language from another 
abortion-related case: 
This Court's abortion decisions have already worked a 
major distortion in the Court's constitutional jurispru-
dence. Today's decision goes further, and makes it painful-
ly clear that no legal rule or doctrine is safe from ad hoc 
nullification by this Court when an occasion for its appli-
cation arises in a case involving state regulations of abor-
tion. 
(quoting Justice O'Connor's dissent in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetri-
cians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 814 (1986». 
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Amendment precedents and traditions," he reasoned that it 
was upheld only because of the majority's ad hoc, result-orient-
ed analysis. 11s This biased analysis, argued Justice Scalia, 
claimed the First Amendment as its victim.119 
Justice Scalia proceeded to describe a videotape entered 
into the trial record by the Clinic containing footage of the 
demonstrations. 120 Presuming that the tape revealed the 
most aggressive activity justifying the injunction, Justice 
Scalia concluded that the tape supported the protesters' case 
more than the Clinic's.121 He described the video as display-
ing a wide range of First Amendment activity, expressed by 
both pro-life and pro-choice activists. 122 Justice Scalia empha-
sized, however, that the video failed to provide evidence of 
violence near the Clinic or attempts to prevent access to and 
118. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2535. Justice Scalia asserted: "The entire injunction 
in this case departs so far from the established course of our jurisprudence that in 
any other context it would have been regarded as a candidate for summary rever-
saL" [d. at 2534. Justice Scalia went on to explain the main reasons behind his 
dissent: 
[d. at 2535. 
Because I believe that the judicial creation of a 36-foot 
zone in which only a particular group, which has broken 
no law, cannot exercise its rights of speech, assembly, and 
association, and the judicial enactment of a noise prohibi-
tion, applicable to that group and that group alone, are 
profoundly at odds with out First Amendment precedents 
and traditions, I dissent. 
119. See id. ("Today the ad hoc nullification machine claims its latest, greatest, 
and most surprising victim: the First Amendment."). 
120. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2535-37. Justice Scalia explained that the videotape 
was shot by employees and volunteers at the Aware Woman Clinic on three Satur-
days in February and March of 1993, that the camera location appears to have 
been an upper floor of the Clinic, and that the tape was edited down from approx-
imately 6-8 hours to 112 an hour. [d. at 2535. 
121. [d. 
122. [d. According to Justice Scalia, the First Amendment activity displayed on 
the videotape included: 
1d. 
[Slinging, chanting, praying, shouting, the playing of mu-
sic both from the clinic and from handheld boom boxes, 
speeches, peaceful picketing, communication of familiar 
political messages, handbilling, persuasive speech directed 
at opposing groups on the issue of abortion, efforts to 
persuade individuals not to have abortions, personal testi-
mony, interviews with the press, and media efforts to 
report on the protest. 
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from the Clinic. 123 
B. STRICT SCRUTINY Is THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD FOR 
SPEECH-RESTRICTIVE INJUNCTIONS 
Justice Scalia next took issue with the new standard an-
nounced by the majority.124 Although he agreed that different 
standards should govern ordinances as opposed to injunctions, 
Justice Scalia asserted that injunctions deserve an even strict-
er standard than that imposed by the majority.126 Justice 
Scalia went so far as to state that strict scrutiny was the ap-
propriate standard. 126 
Justice Scalia proposed three specific reasons why injunc-
tions challenged on First Amendment grounds should receive 
strict scrutiny. First, injunctions are susceptible to misuse by 
judges favoring one side of a dispute and suppressing ideas of 
the other side.127 Second, individual judges, rather than legis-
latures, should not be trusted to impose injunctions, often on 
those who have previously disobeyed the judge's order. 128 
Third, injunctions are procedurally more difficult to challenge 
than ordinances.129 
123. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2535. 
124. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2537-38 (1994) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Kennedy and 
Thomas, JJ.). 
125. [d. at 2538. Justice Scalia felt that the majority's new standard, although 
it purports to be stricter than intermediate scrutiny, is actually little different 
than intermediate scrutiny. Justice Scalia stated: "The Court does not give this 
new standard a name, but perhaps we could call it intermediate-intermediate 
scrutiny. The difference between it and intermediate scrutiny . . . is frankly too 
subtle for me too describe." [d. 
126. [d. 
127. [d. Justice Scalia gave the example of a judge who enjoins picketing at a 
labor dispute site. The judge knows he is enjoining the expression of pro-union 
views and thus, his personal bias may be reflected in his court order. Unless it is 
content-based, general legislation does not similarly target one side of a dispute or 
another. ld. at 2538-39. 
128. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2539. Justice Scalia recognized that speech-restrict-
ing injunctions "are the product of individual judges rather than legislatures-and 
often of judges who have been chagrined by prior disobedience of their orders. The 
right to free speech should not lightly be placed within the control of a single 
man or woman." [d. 
129. ld. at 2538. Justice Scalia explained that the collateral bar rule of Walker 
v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967), eliminated the defense that the injunction 
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Justice Scalia stated that the majority asked the wrong 
question in devising its new standard: 
The real question in this case is not whether 
intermediate scrutiny, which the Court assumes 
to be some kind of default standard, should be 
supplemented because of the distinctive charac-
teristics of injunctions; but rather whether those 
distinctive characteristics are not, for reasons of 
both policy and precedent, fully as good as "con-
tent-basis" for demanding strict scrutiny.l30 
As Justice Scalia explained, the dangers of censorship and 
discrimination which require content-based legislation to pass 
strict scrutiny are equally prevalent in injunctive orders; in-
junctions, therefore, deserve the same level of scrutiny.13l 
Although Justice Scalia would apply strict scrutiny to 
injunctions which are not content-based,132 he believed the 
injunction here actually was content-based.133 Justice Scalia 
saw the injunction as discriminatory on the basis of beliefs 
because it applied to "all persons acting in concert or participa-
tion with [the named individuals and organizations], or on 
their behalf."134 Thus, he therefore viewed this clause as evi-
dence that the injunction applied not just to conduct, but to 
viewpoints and ideas as wel1. 135 According to Justice Scalia, 
itself was unconstitutional. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2539. Therefore, if people feel 
that an injunction imposed upon them is unconstitutional, they must first chal-
lenge the injunction in court; if they disregard it, they are prohibited from later 
claiming in a contempt proceeding that their First Amendment rights were violat-
ed. 1d. Thus, individuals lacking the resources to appeal an injunction must re-
main silent and forgo their freedom of speech rights, for if they ignore the injunc-
tion and speak, their First Amendment rights are no longer a defense. [d. 
130. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2538. 
131. [d. 
132. 1d. at 2539. 
133. [d. In fact, Justice Scalia found the injunction to be viewpoint-based as 
well because the injunction only targeted people with a particular viewpoint -
those opposed to abortion. [d. 
134. [d. 
135. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2539. Justice Scalia further supported his position 
by providing an account of an April 1993 hearing before the trial judge issuing 
the injunction. The hearing concerned a number of arrests made for walking with-
in the 36-foot buffer zone and contained the following exchanges: 
Mr. Lacy: "I was wondering how we can-why we 
were arrested and confined as being in concert with these 
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even the issuing judge construed the "acting in concert or par-
ticipation" provision to pertain to "all those who wish to ex-
press the same views as the named defendants. "136 
people that we don't know, when other people weren't, 
that were in that same buffer zone, and it was kind of 
selective as to who was picked and who was arrested and 
who was obtained for the same buffer zone in the same 
public injunction." 
The Court: "Mr. Lacy, I understand that those on 
the other side of the issue [abortion-rights supporters) 
were also in the area. If you are referring to them, the 
Injunction did not pertain to those on the other side of 
the issue, because the word in concert means those in 
concert with those who had taken a certain position in 
respect to the clinic, adverse to the clinic. If you are say-
ing that is the selective basis that the pro-choice were not 
arrested when pro-life was arrested, that's the basis of 
selection. " 
And John Doe No. 16 " ... I also understand that 
the reason why I was arrested was because I acted in 
concert with those who were demonstrating pro-life. I 
guess the question that I'm asking is were the beliefs in 
ideologies of the people that were present, were those 
taken into consideration when we were arrested?. . 
When you issued the Injunction did you determine that it 
would only apply to - that it would apply only to people 
that were demonstrating that were pro-life?" 
The Court: "In effect, yes." 
Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2540 (citing Trans. 104-05, 113-116 (Apr. 12, 1993 Appear-
ance Hearings Held Before Judge McGregor, Eighteenth Judicial Circuit, Seminole 
County, Florida». 
136. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2539-40. Justice Scalia also disagreed with the 
majority's dismissal of prior restraint analysis for the injunction. Justice Scalia 
asserted that "an injunction against speech is the very prototype of the greatest 
threat to First Amendment values, the prior restraint." Id. at 2541. Justice Scalia 
pointed out that just last Term, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court: "The 
term prior restraint is used 'to describe administrative and judicial orders forbid-
ding certain communications when issued in advance of the time that such com-
munications are to occur'. . .. [P)ermanent injunctions, i.e.,-court orders that 
actually forbid speech activities-are classic examples of prior restraints." Id. (quot-
ing Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766 (1993)) (quoting M. Nimmer, 
Nimmer on Freedom of Speech § 4.03, p. 4-14 (1984) (emphasis added in Alexan-
der)). 
In Madsen, the majority concluded that the injunction was not a prior re-
straint because it only restrained speech in a certain area and the basis for its 
issuance was not content but prior unlawful conduct. See id. at 2524 n.2. Justice 
Scalia felt these distinctions had no basis in precedent. See id. at 2541. 
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C. EVEN UNDER THE MAJORITY'S NEW STANDARD, ALL 
INJUNCTION PROVISIONS FAIL 
Even applying the majority's standard, Justice Scalia 
found the injunction offensive to the First Amendment.137 He 
explained the circumstances under which injunctions are is-
sued: "[UJnder general equity principles, an injunction issues 
only if there is a showing that the defendant has violated, or 
imminently will violate, some provision of statutory or common 
law."13S Because Justice Scalia found that the trial record 
lacked factual findings that protesters engaged in behavior 
violative qf the original injunction,139 he determined that the 
amended injunction should never have been issued.140 Justice 
Scalia thereby concluded that the amended injunction neces-
sarily burdened considerably more speech than necessary.141 
137. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2544 (1994). 
138. 1d. (quoting United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953». 
139. 1d. According to Justice Scalia, the majority accepted, without adequate 
proof, the fact that the protesters violated the original iIijunction. Justice Scalia 
stated: 
1d. at 2545. 
The Court simply takes this on faith-even though viola-
tion 'of the original injunction is an essential part of the 
reasoning whereby it approves portions of the amended 
iIijunction, even though petitioners denied any violation of 
the original iIijunction, even though the utter lack of 
proper basis for the other challenged portions of the in-
junction hardly inspires confidence that the lower courts 
knew what they were doing, and even though close exam-
ination of the factual basis for essential conclusions is the 
usual practice in First Amendment cases. 
140. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2548. Justice Scalia summed up his position as 
follows: 
1d. 
The interests assertedly protected by the supplementary 
iIijunction did not include any interest whose impairment 
was a violation of Florida law or of a Florida-court iIijunc-
tion. Unless the Court intends today to overturn long-
settled jurisprudence, that means that the interests can-
not possibly qualify as 'significant interests' under the 
Court's new standard. 
141. 1d. Justice Scalia found that the only behavior conceivably related to a 
violation of the original iIijunction included the incidental effects of persons walk-
ing in a picket line and leafletting on public property, behavior such as "causing 
traffic on the street in front of the abortion clinic to slow down, and causing vehi-
cles crossing the pedestrian right-of-way, between the streets and the clinic's park-
ing lot, to slow down or even, occasionally, to stop momentarily while pedestrians 
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Furthermore, Justice Scalia objected to the fact that the 
trial court failed to use less restrictive alternatives regarding 
the thirty-six foot buffer zone: "[T]here are surely a number of 
ways to protect [the state's] interests short of banishing the 
entire protest demonstration from the 36-foot zone."142 Justice 
Scalia explained that the trial court could have ordered the 
demonstrators to stay out of the street, limited the number of 
protesters permitted on the Clinic side of the street, or forbid-
den pickets on driveways. 143 Moreover, he found the 
majority's rejection of these options to mock the requirement 
that restrictions "burden no more speech than necessary."I44 
Regarding the "no-noise-within-earshot-of-patients" provi-
sion, Justice Scalia asserted that the "First Amendment ... 
reels in disbelief."145 According to Justice Scalia, this provi-
sion is no more than a "judge-crafted abridgement of 
speech."146 He argued that neither the majority nor the Flori-
da Supreme Court ever attempted to link the "no noise" provi-
sion with any prior violation of law.147 Because the trial re-
cord lacked evidence of the existence or violation of a law re-
stricting noise near the Clinic, Justice Scalia found it imper-
missible for a single judge to impose his own self-created law 
against a limited class of social protesters.148 Justice Scalia 
noted that the two cases149 cited by the majority in support of 
the noise restriction were distinguishable because each in-
volved restrictions of general application; they were imposed 
got out of the way." [d. at 2546. Justice Scalia felt that these results were not 
intentional and that the original injunction did not intend to prohibit such inciden-
tal effects. [d. 
142. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2548. 
143. [d. 
144. [d. at 2548-49. Justice Scalia complained that "[t)he Court's only response 
to these options is that '[t)he state court was convinced that [they would not 
work) in view of the failure of the first injunction to protect access' . . . . If the 
'burden no more speech than necessary' requirement can be avoided by merely 
opining that (for some reason) no lesser restriction than this one will be obeyed, it 
is not much of a requirement at all." [d. 
145. [d at 2547. 
146. [d. 
147. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2547. 
148. [d. 
149. See NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 442 U.S. 773 (1979) (upholding generally-
applicable noise restriction near a hospital); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 
104 (1972) (upholding a generally-applicable noise ordinance). 
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upon the public at large, not upon an isolated class of protest-
ers. 150 
VI. A CALIFORNIA CASE VACATED AND REMANDED IN 
LIGHT OF MADSEN 
Because the Madsen standard acts as a federal mandate 
on courts nationwide, injunctions reviewed under the former, 
intermediate standard may no longer be valid under the new, 
stricter standard. The United States Supreme Court has re-
cently vacated and remanded a number of state court decisions 
involving injunctions at abortion clinics. 151 One of these va-
cated decisions is Planned Parenthood v. Williams. 152 
In Williams, the California Supreme Court upheld an 
injunction prohibiting protesters from demonstrating on a 
public sidewalk in front of the abortion clinic.15s Protesters 
were therefore limited to demonstrating across the street, 
which is where the thirty-six foot buffer zone in Madsen left 
the Florida protesters. 154 
150. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2547. Justice Scalia concluded his dissent by la-
menting the injustice engendered by the majority's decision and describing the 
errors in its opinion: 
The proposition that injunctions against speech are subject 
to a standard indistinguishable from (unless perhaps more 
lenient in its application than) the "intermediate scrutiny" 
standard we have used for "time, place, and manner" 
legislative restrictions; the notion that injunctions against 
speech need not be closely tied to any violation of law, 
but may simply implement sound social policy; and the 
practice of accepting trial-court conclusions permitting 
injunctions without considering whether those conclusions 
are supported by any findings of fact-these latest by-
products of our abortion jurisprudence ought to give all 
friends of liberty great concern. 
[d. at 2549-50. 
15l. Scott Graham, Abortion 'Buffer Zone' Ruling is Struck Down, THE RECORD-
ER, Nov. 1, 1994, at 1. See, e.g., Lawson v. Murray, 130 L. Ed. 2d 6 (1994), vacat-
ing and remanding Murray v. Lawson, 624 A.2d 3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1993). 
152. 873 P.2d 1224 (Cal. 1994). 
153. [d. at 1226. 
154. The two cases are similar in other respects as well. In Williams, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court rejected the protesters' contention that the injunction was 
content-based, giving the same reasoning and precedent found in the Madsen opin-
ion. See id. at 1229-30. The Williams court also identified similar governmental 
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The Williams court found that the injunction was content-
neutral and accordingly applied the traditional, intermediate 
standard appropriate for time, place, and manner regula-
tions. 155 The California Supreme Court concluded, as did the 
Florida Supreme Court when it analyzed the injunction in-
volved in the Madsen case, that the injunction was narrowly 
tailored to protect significant state interests and left open 
ample alternative avenues of communication.156 Nonetheless, 
because the California Supreme Court used the intermediate 
standard rather than the "burden no more speech than neces-
sary" standard, the decision was vacated by the United States 
Supreme Court and now must be reconsidered in light of 
Madsen. l57 
The sidewalk exclusion in Williams is similar to the thirty-
six foot buffer zone upheld in Madsen; thus, the California 
Supreme Court may find the facts in Madsen analogous to 
Williams and reaffirm the injunction despite the tougher stan-
dard it must apply. However, one of the main issues in Wil-
liams revolved around the "narrowly tailored" requirement. 
The protesters, as well as the dissenting opinion, urged that 
the sidewalk exclusion was broader than necessary to serve the 
state's goals. l5s The majority disagreed that such precise tai-
loring was necessary, relying heavily on Ward v. Rock Against 
Racism. l59 Ward held that narrow tailoring is not synony-
mous with least restrictive means: "So long as the means cho-
sen are not substantially broader than necessary to achieve the 
government's interest ... the regulation will not be invalid 
simply because a court concludes that the government's inter-
est could be adequately served by some less-speech-restrictive 
alternative."l6o Contrary to Ward, Madsen's new standard re-
quires that injunctions "burden no more speech than neces-
sary," implying that if a less-speech restrictive alternative 
interests as those held in Madsen to justify the restriction. Id. at 1231-33. 
155. Id. at 1229. 
156. Williams, 873 P.2d at 1233-36. The Madsen case was titled Operation 
Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 626 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1993), when it was 
before the Florida Supreme Court. 
157. Williams v. Planned Parenthood, 115 S. Ct. 413 (1994). 
158. Williams, 873 P.2d at 1235, 1243-45. 
159. Id. at 124. See Ward, 491 U.S. 781 (1989). 
160. Williams, 873 P.2d at 1233 (citing Ward, 491 U.S. at 797, 800). 
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exists, failure to use it would, by definition, "burden more 
speech than necessary."161 Thus, Madsen seems to suggest 
that the holding in Ward no longer applies to speech restrictive 
injunctions. 
Furthermore, the Williams court explained that intermedi-
ate scrutiny does not require "quibbling over a few feet. "162 
The Madsen Court, on the other hand, emphasized that the 
new standard's goal is "precision of regulation," requiring that 
an injunction be "couched in the narrowest terms that will 
accomplish its pin-pointed objective."163 Such language indi-
cates that the Madsen Court takes the narrowly tailored re-
quirement very seriously; loose-fitting regulations or even any 
overbroadness appear impermissible under the new standard. 
Because the flexibility depended on in Williams has since 
been eroded by Madsen's more rigorous standard/64 and be-
cause Williams was a close case with a strong dissenting opin-
ion,165 Williams will have difficulty withstanding a stricter 
level of scrutiny. Nonetheless, Madsen has thus far only been 
applied to its own facts. It is hard to predict exactly how lower 
courts will interpret the new standard for injunctions and how 
stringently they will apply it. 
VII. CRITIQUE 
A. THE NEW STANDARD HELPS PROTESTERS, HURTS ABORTION 
CLINICS 
The standard announced by the United States Supreme 
Court in Madsen shifts the balance in favor of anti-abortion 
protesters by requiring that injunctions against them with-
stand a higher degree of scrutiny.l66 Although Madsen upheld 
the thirty-six foot buffer zone,167 the standard the Court de-
161. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2527 (1994). 
162. Williams, 873 P.2d at 1235. 
163. See Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2526 (discussing the standard applied in Carroll 
v. President and Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 183 (1968)). 
164. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2525. 
165. Williams, 873 P.2d at 1238·45 (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
166. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2526 (1994). 
167. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2530. 
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veloped may portend trouble for other beleaguered abortion 
clinics. Such clinics will now have to make stronger showings 
of necessity in order to obtain or sustain protective injunctions. 
In close cases, such as Williams, clinics which received an 
injunction under the intermediate standard may lose the in-
junction when subjected to the new, stricter standard. 168 
Consequently, women's reproductive rights may suffer. 
While protesters benefit from the new standard, women's 
rights advocates, clinic doctors and workers, and those seeking 
clinic services have little to gain from this standard. Women 
risk losing their injunctions and facing harassment, embar-
rassment, and fear in order to exercise their constitutionally 
protected right to choose abortion. 
B. THE NEW STANDARD Is APPROPRIATE FOR SPEECH-
RESTRICTIVE INJUNCTIONS 
Although the Court's new standard may prove more diffi-
cult for pro-choice advocates, the reasoning behind it is sound. 
The differences between statutes and injunctions support the 
conclusion that injunctions require their own standard.169 In-
junctions, imposed by individual judges instead of legislatures, 
carry greater dangers of discrimination and censorship. 170 
Subjecting injunctions to a slightly higher level of scrutiny is 
therefore justified. 
When injunctions infringe upon First Amendment activity, 
protesters' rights must be afforded higher degrees of protec-
tion. The First Amendment should take precedence, and inci-
dental infringements on speech should be permitted only when 
and to the extent necessary to protect the states' interests. 
The new standard announced by the Madsen majority accom-
plishes this result; it allows courts to balance competing inter-
ests while prohibiting them from unnecessarily abridging 
168. See Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2526·30. 
169. See supra note 57 for a discussion regarding the differences between in· 
junctions and ordinances. 
170. See supra notes 58·59 and accompanying tert for a discussion regarding 
the dangers of injunctions. 
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protesters' First Amendment rights. l7l 
C. THE NEED TO PROTECT ABORTION CLINIC ACCESS Is 
INCREASING 
Although protesters' rights deserve protection, the states' 
interest in protecting clinic access should not be underestimat-
ed. Abortion, like free speech, is a constitutionally protected 
right.172 Because pro-life protesters cannot lawfully prohibit 
abortions, they often resort to tactics of intimidation, threats, 
and even violence.173 Increasingly, abortion clinics have be-
come targets for bombings, fires,174 and shootings,175 result-
ing in lost lives and extensive property damage. 
Unfortunately, for women seeking abortion related servic-
es, aggressive anti-abortion crusades have proven effective in 
hampering access to such services.176 Recent statistics show 
that 84% of United States counties are now without abortion 
171. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2523-26 (1994). 
172. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
173. The Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources assembled the 
following evidence of clinic violence: "From 1977 to April 1993, more than 1,000 
acts of violence and more than 6,000 clinic blockades against abortion providers 
were reported in the United States. Included were at least 327 clinic invasions, 
131 death threats, 84 assaults, 81 arsons, 36 bombings, two kidnappings and one 
murder." Bruce Fein, Free Speech Depends on the Speaker, TExAs LAWYER, July 
25, 1994, at 24. Such clinic-related violence led to the enactment of federal legisla-
tion, the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994, (FACE). The statute 
subjects persons to federal penalties for interfering with access to abortion clinics. 
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 248 (1994). 
174. Within the month of February 1995, six abortion clinics along the Califor-
nia coast suffered arson attacks. Dexter Waugh, Feds link {ires at 6 health clinics, 
SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, Mar. 2, 1995, at AI. There have been a surge of at-
tacks at clinics around the country, and the FBI is investigating the possibility of 
a national conspiracy against abortion clinic providers. 1d. at A12. 
175. On December 30, 1994, John Salvi killed two women and wounded at least 
five other people at two abortion clinics in Brookline, Massachusetts. 
In 1993, Dr. David Gunn, a Florida physician who provided abortions, was 
shot and killed by Paul Hill, a man participating in anti-abortion demonstrations 
at the Pensacola Women's Health Clinic. Rohter, Doctor is Slain During Protest 
Over Abortions, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1993, at AI. 
176. Fred Bayles, Abortion foes put choice on the run, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMIN-
ER, Jan. 7, 1995, at A1, A16. "Some 200 sites that provided abortion, mostly in 
smaller rural and public hospitals, have halted the procedure in the last four 
years in the face of the threat of violence, financial woes and political opposition." 
1d. at A1. 
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service providers.177 Anti-abortion groups are largely respon-
sible for this reduction, as well as for increasing costs for pro-
viders striving to keep services running.178 Although rural 
communities are the hardest hit, metropolitan areas may soon 
feel an impact. 179 
D. BALANCING THE INTERESTS 
Under the new standard announced by the Madsen court, 
evaluating the constitutionality of an injunction in the First 
Amendment context essentially becomes a balancing test; 
courts must balance whether a state's interest in protecting 
clinic access is "necessary" enough to justify incidental in-
fringements upon protesters' First Amendment rights. The 
Madsen standard tipped the balance slightly in favor of pro-
testers by allowing greater protection for their First Amend-
ment rights.180 On the other side of the scale, however, are 
abortion clinics, whose need for protection, already strong, is 
increasing. 
Although the Madsen Court articulated and applied a 
stricter standard, the Court nonetheless sustained the thirty-
six foot buffer zone, finding that the state interest in protecting 
clinic access was strong enough to overcome protesters' First 
Amendment rightS.18l Since Madsen was decided, the need to 
protect clinic access has grown even stronger. 182 The decrease 
in abortion service providers and increase in clinic related vio-
lence reveal the current vulnerability of abortion clinics. Al-
though each case involving clinic access protection is ultimate-
ly fact-specific and must be judged on its own merits, these 
177. See id. at AI, A16. 
178. Id. at A16. The president of National Women's Health Organization, opera-
tor of nine women's clinics in eight states, estimated that her organization had 
spent $1 million in security and legal fees since the early 1980's: "Its been a state 
of siege for 10 to 12 years. The metropolitan areas are just realizing it now them-
selves." Id. 
179. Id. Paul deParrie, editor of Life Advocate Magazine in Portland was eager 
to claim victory for these developments: "There is no doubt the pro-life side is 
winning . . . . The outlying communities have stopped doing abortions, and it al-
lows us to concentrate on the hard-core abortion mills in the cities." Id. 
180. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2523-26 (1994). 
181. See Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2527. 
182. See supra notes 173-79 and accompanying text. 
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factors should weigh in favor of abortion clinics when courts 
balance the competing interests, because they explain how 
necessary clinic protection has become. 
The new standard makes it slightly more difficult for clin-
ics to obtain and sustain injunctions; nonetheless, if courts 
properly acknowledge the continuing and increasing need for 
clinic protection, buffer zone regulations will generally remain 
constitutional despite the stricter standard courts must apply. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
In Madsen v. Woman's Health Ctr., Inc., 183 the United 
States Supreme Court created a stricter standard for examin-
ing the constitutionality of content-neutral injunctions and 
applied that standard to sustain or strike down different provi-
sions of the injunction. l84 The Court upheld the thirty-six foot 
buffer zone surrounding the Clinic and the noise restrictions, 
but overturned the "images observable" provision, the three 
hundred foot no-approach zone, the thirty-six foot buffer zone 
applied to the private property north and west of the Clinic, 
and the three hundred foot buffer zone around residences. 185 
Perhaps the Florida Supreme Court summed up the situa-
tion best when it stated: 
While the First Amendment confers on each 
citizen a powerful right to express oneself, it 
gives the picketer no boon to jeopardize the 
health, safety, and rights of others. No citizen 
has a right to insert a foot in the hospital or 
clinic door and insist on being heard-while 
purposely blocking the door to those in genuine 
need of medical services. No picketer can force 
speech into the captive ear of the unwilling and 
disabled. 186 
183. 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994). 
184. See supra notes 40·103 and accompanying text. 
185. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2530. 
186. Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 626 So. 2d 664, 675 (Fla. 
1993). 
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The importance of the First Amendment remains undis-
puted; its fundamental guarantees of free speech and assembly 
are the cornerstone of our democratic society. Nonetheless, 
when "free speech" is used as a weapon to prevent others from 
exercising their constitutional rights, appropriately tailored 
iIijunctions can provide an essential tool in restoring rights to 
their proper balance. 
Jennifer Wohlstadter· 
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